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Over the last two decades welfare policies have undergone major
reforms in Anglo-Western nations such as the U.S., U.K. and
Australia. Central to these reforms have been the revision of
welfare recipient entitlements and responsibilities and the emer-
gence of a responsibility and obligations agenda. The essence of
this agenda is conditionality and reciprocity, and it includes the
threat of punitive sanctions for failing to comply with mandatory
participation requirements. This paper highlights the potent influ-
ence of the ideas of American conservatives on policy reforms in
the U.S., the U.K. and Australia and provides a thematic cross-
national comparison of sanctioning policies in these nations.
Key words: Sanctioning, welfare dependency, neo-liberalism, re-
sponsibility
Anglo-Western welfare policy reforms have been widely
debated over the past two decades with many arguing a neo-
liberal policy convergence is discernable, particularly in the
U.S., the U.K. and Australia, and some asserting the emergence
of a "new social contract" (Dean, 2002; Gilbert, 2009; Jordan,
1996; Kerr & Savelsberg, 1999; McDonald & Reisch, 2008). The
basis of these reforms rests largely on a critique of the tradi-
tional welfare ethos which was underpinned by entitlement or
needs-based government social assistance. This unconditional
social assistance is deemed by prominent neoliberals to be a
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moral hazard for recipients, stifling self-reliance and foster-
ing a 'heritage of defeat' and potentially sowing the seeds of
an 'underclass' (Mead, 1997; Murray, 1984, 1990). To counter
this supposed corrosive influence, many neoliberals argue
for the scaling back of government assistance and greater ac-
countability and reciprocity from welfare recipients, especially
in regards to entitlements and responsibilities. The views of
American commentators Laurence Mead, Charles Murray and
George Gilder have been particularly influential in the West
and have created 'welfare dependence' as a social problem and
called for welfare recipients to fulfill strict obligations (Kalil,
Seefeldt, & Wang, 2002; Kemshall, 2002; Kerr & Savelsberg,
1999; McDonald & Reisch, 2008; Muncie, 2006; O'Connor,
2001).
The assumptions and beliefs implicit in this policy im-
perative, which incorporates mandatory participation require-
ments and sanctioning (or breaching as it is more commonly
known in Australia), have been the subject of considerable
debate in the U.S. (Daugherty & Barber, 2001; Hasenfeld,
Ghose, & Larson, 2004; Kalil, et al., 2002; Wu, 2008), the U.K.
(Dean, 2002; MacDonald & Marsh, 2005; Mizen, 2004; Stanley,
2005) and Australia (Goodin, 2002; Kinnear, 2003; Mendes,
2003; O'Connor, 2001; Saunders, 2002; Savelsberg, 2009; Sawer,
2005). A major concern emerging from this debate is the impact
of sanctions for noncompliance of mandatory participation
requirements on the disadvantaged and vulnerable. Indeed,
over the last decade, a body of research literature has devel-
oped which suggests that sanctioning is not, as was initially
intended by social policy makers, making welfare recipients
more responsible (Muncie, 2006), but rather further entrench-
ing their disadvantage and social exclusion.
Based on a review of American, British and Australian
welfare reform literature and research, this paper assesses the
progressive influence of American conservative thinkers, such
as Gilder, Murray and Mead, on the development of American,
Australian and British welfare policy reforms. Their work was
particularly influential on welfare policy reform in the U.S.
during the Reagan administration, and their ideas, especially
dependency and sanctioning, would once again find popular-
ity in the U.K. with the Thatcher and later the Blair govern-
ments and the Howard (Liberal National) Coalition, and now
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with the Rudd Labor Governments in Australia. This paper
presents a cross-national thematic comparison of sanction
policies from research findings to identify issues and trends
regarding some of the commonly reported effects of sanction-
ing on welfare recipients.
Most of the Australian research data presented in this pub-
lication is drawn from a Ph.D. research study completed in
2009 (Savelsberg, 2009). This study investigated the impact of
the Australian Youth Allowance (YA) and Mutual Obligation
(MO) policies and associated sanctioning provisions on the
social circumstances and future prospects of disadvantaged
young people. Specifically, it examined the ideological under-
pinnings of these policies, especially the assumptions (person-
al and social), and how these reconcile with young peoples'
socio-economic contexts, particularly the key institutions of
support (family, education and employment).
A review of Australian, U.S. and U.K. literature and re-
search on sanctioning policies was undertaken in regards to
the philosophical underpinnings, frequency and effects of
sanctioning policy. Specifically in the U.S., in relation to the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) and the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) policy; in the U.K., Labour's "New Deal"
policies; and in Australia, the Mutual Obligation policy.
The Rise of Sanctioning Policies in the U.S.,
U.K. and Australia
The Howard Coalition Government's Social Security
Amendment Bill enshrined the use of sanctions in Australian leg-
islation, drawing to a close the gradual erosion of entitlement-
based welfare, progressively underway since the late 1980s,
and signifying the full adoption of an "active participation"
welfare system (Finn, 1999; Kinnear, 2002; Moses & Sharples,
2000). This shift in Australian social policy has been described
as the "new deal" regarding social welfare entitlements, espe-
cially in regards to recipient obligations (Kerr & Savelsberg,
1999, p. 125). This new deal, expressed in Australian Federal
Government policy statements as Mutual Obligation, reflects
a free-market ideology ordered by a new social contractual
relationship between welfare recipients, the state and the
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community-from welfare to workfare (Kerr & Savelsberg,
1999; Kinnear, 2003; McDonald & Reisch, 2008; Sawer, 2005).
A similar activation-style policy approach can be discerned
in the U.S. and U.K. welfare reforms. Lindhorst and Mancoske
refer to the introduction of the PRWORA in the U.S.-the
vehicle used by the federal government to increase the labor
force participation of single mothers and thus reduce their de-
pendency on public assistance and expand state sanctioning
powers. They write:
To amplify the consequences for failing to comply
with new program requirements, Congress .passed
a mandatory time limit of 60 months for receipt of
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF),
and allowed states the option of imposing stricter
sanctions on families that were not following through
on mandated activities. As a result, states now have
greater latitude to involuntarily remove TANF families
from the welfare rolls, without regard to their social or
economic circumstances. (Lindhorst & Mancoske, 2006,
p. 94)
In the U.K., "New Labour entered office in 1997 with a strong
commitment to address the problems of the unemployed ... Its
first action, for example, was to instigate its New Deal employ-
ment program ... a 'welfare to work' program" (France, 2007,
p. 63). Dean (2002, p. 195), referring to the work of Fairclough
(2000), notes that "the very expression, 'New Deal'... articu-
lates a populist interpretation of contractarianism; a trade off
between the government and the people." Further, Dean notes
that this "increased emphasis on the conditionality of welfare
rights ... Explicitly or by implication ... accepted as inevitable
the end of the protectionist welfare state" in the U.K. These
changes also led to an expanded use of sanctions in each of
the three nations, as participation (or work) requirements were
tightened, eligibility and exemption criteria narrowed and new
sanctionable behaviors identified (France, 2007; Furlong &
Cartmel, 2007; Hasenfeld, et al., 2004; Savelsberg, 2009). Whilst
sanctions were already in use in the U.K., U.S. and Australia,
prior to the introduction of the PRWORA, the New Deal ar-
rangements and the Mutual Obligation policy, their usage was
minimal or restricted to only certain categories of recipients.
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As the welfare systems of these countries transformed from
largely entitlement-based systems towards more activation-
style systems-focussed on moving recipients into paid work
or some other activity aimed at improving employability-the
use of sanctions increased, with sanctions now playing a key
role in the enforcement of participation requirements.
As is the case in the U.S. (Lohman et al., 2004) and the U.K.
(Finn, 1998; Mizen, 2004), sanctioning in Australia is a form
of benefit reduction for those welfare recipients who do not
comply with welfare regulations or participation require-
ments (commonly referred to as activity test requirements in
Australia). In the U.S., the PRWORA allows individual States
to "define the types of penalties that can be imposed for non-
compliance with work-related rules and the circumstances
governing them. These include family grant reductions and
immediate case closure" (Kalil et al., 2002, p. 643). In the U.K.,
New Labour has introduced financial penalties against the
work-shy, as Frank Field, a former Blair Government Minister
explained: "The public will not support a social security system
that appears to tell people they can sit in bed all day watching
television and drawing benefit" (Field, cited in Powell, 2000, p.
45). As such, young people in the U.K. who fail to participate
in a New Deal option without good cause "can be subjected
to a two-week benefit sanction. A second or any subsequent
refusal results in a four-week sanction" (Finn, 1998, p. 115).
In Australia a person who fails to comply with any activity
test requirement without a "reasonable excuse" may incur an
Activity Test breach and as a consequence a temporary (18%)
reduction in benefits for 26 weeks. A subsequent sanction
results in a greater reduction (24%) in income for 26 weeks,
and for a third sanction the penalty is non-payment of ben-
efits for eight weeks (Department of Family and Community
Services [DFaCS], 2007). There are also separate sanctions for
administrative breaches, such as failing to attend an interview
at Centrelink, which can also result in a reduction in benefits
(16% for 13 weeks) (Mullins, 2002).
The Influence of American Conservative Thinkers
The views of American conservatives Murray, Mead and
Gilder have been particularly influential in the shaping of
welfare policy in Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. As Deprez
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(2008, p. 113) notes, in the U.S. the welfare reform debates of
the 1980s were heavily influenced by "conservative theorists'
proposals for reform," contained within six books published
from 1978 to 1986, three of which were written by Murray
(1985) Losing Ground-American Social Policy, 1950-1980, Mead
(1986) Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship
and Gilder (1981) Wealth and Poverty. Peck and Theodore argue
that for the U.K. Blair Government it was not just ...
a simple case of replicating U.S.-style [workfare]
programs. Rather, the U.S. reform process has
established some of the key coordinates around which
U.K. reforms are being planned and assessed. The
discursive framing of the U.K. welfare debate, however,
substantially echoes its American counterpart, not
least since welfare reform has been taken up in New
Labour circles as the very epitome of Third Way policy-
making-pragmatic, realistic, tough and (ostensibly)
'post-ideological.' (Peck & Theodore, 2001, pp. 437-
438)
In regards to Australia, O'Connor writes "[t]he polemical
views of George Gilder and Charles Murray ... now find an
echo in the Howard Government's rhetoric about and focus
on the 'challenge of welfare dependency"' (O'Connor, 2001, p.
232).
Peck and Theodore (2001, p. 450) caution that in the case
of welfare reform in the U.K. (and also arguably in Australia)
it is not just a matter of U.S. policies being replicated, rather it
was the adoption of "more general political strategies of reform
management-focusing on issues of dependency, the virtues
of work, and so forth."
Welfare Dependency and Sanctioning-The Need for
Personal Responsibility?
Dependency and Sanctions
Two key ideas advanced by American conservatives
have been enthusiastically embraced by Australian and U.K.
governments-namely, welfare dependency and the need for
compulsion and penalties (sanctioning) to ensure compliance
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with participation requirements (Dean, 2002; Kemp, 1988;
Mendes, 2003; O'Connor, 2001). The U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, in its 2008 Annual Report to Congress,
defines welfare dependency as "the proportion of all individu-
als in families that receive more than half of their total family
income in one year from TANF, food stamps, and/or SSI
[Supplemental Security Income]" (Crouse, Hauan, & Waters
Rogers, 2008, chapter 1, para 11).
In the U.K., Peck and Theodore (2001, p. 429) refer to the
adoption of an "Americanized" understanding of welfare
dependency by the Blair government, specifically defined as
the "ostensibly dysfunctional lifestyles and malformed work
ethics of the poor."
Surprisingly, welfare dependency has never been defined
in a concrete way by Australian Governments, with a definition
notably absent from the Howard Government's 1999 The
Challenge of Welfare Dependency in the 21st Century discussion
paper on welfare dependency (Newman, 1999). Importantly, no
government policy or discussion paper has ever specified how
much or which type of income support an individual could
receive before they would be considered welfare dependent
(Henman, 2001).
In the absence of an official Australian government defi-
nition, Saunders and Stone (2000) offer three possible under-
standings of the term welfare dependency. The first, "depen-
dency culture as myth," a position long argued by Marxist
scholars, holds that no such culture exists. Long-term welfare
dependent poor are not viewed as culturally or behaviorally
different from the working class as a whole. The argument that
there exists a distinctive culture of welfare dependent unem-
ployed people is often dismissed on the grounds that this is
an ideological myth created to deflect attention away from the
real causes (globalization and capital restructuring) of unem-
ployment. The second "dependency culture as cause" or "cul-
tural underclass theory," "holds that there is a distinct culture
among many of those who are long-term welfare dependent,
and that this is a major cause of their initial and continuing
welfare dependency" (Saunders & Stone, 2000, p. 115). This
view has a long, acrimonious history in the underclass debates
that raged across the social sciences in the 80s and 90s especial-
ly in the U.S. and U.K. (Macnicol, 1987; MacDonald & Marsh,
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2005). The third hypothesis, "dependency culture as outcome,"
appears to be a blend of the two understandings above, as-
serting that people who have been welfare dependent for long
periods of time may show distinct values but that "the initial
causes of joblessness will often lie in the collapse of local labor
markets rather than in any self-perpetuating culture of depen-
dency" (Saunders & Stone, 2000, p. 116). This view resonates
with Labour figures such as Third Way writer (and former ALP
leader) Mark Latham (1998) and Frank Field (2000, p. 67) who
argued that the U.K. needs to break out of the welfare equals
State mentality and adopt "pro-active welfare."
Dependency Culture
It is the "dependency culture as cause" or "cultural under-
class theory" explanation, however, that aligns most closely
with the view of the Australian Howard government and also,
to some degree, the current Rudd Labor Government (Head,
2009). For example, former Howard Government Minister
Dr. David Kemp describes how the entitlement-based welfare
system in Australia had created a "culture of dependency"
amongst the young unemployed:
[b]y international comparison, Australia had developed
welfare benefit arrangements which were increasingly
recognized as having perverse incentives-encouraging
young people (who are at risk or 'marginal') to drop out
of school by the too early provision of unemployment
benefit and, because of the comparative levels of income
support available some preferred unemployment to
education and training. These arrangements were
supported by a growing culture of entitlement, which
more and more was seen to be encouraging a damaging
culture of welfare dependence. (Kemp, 1999, p. 13)
In support, Australian academics Saunders and Tsumori
(2003, pp. 2-3), from the Centre for Independent Studies, warn
that a "stratum of long-term unemployed people [will] become
almost permanently detached ... from the world of work and
settled into a routine of life on welfare." In the U.K. context,
Blair's New Deal reflects similar concerns, as Harris (2000, p.
283) asserts "it is suggested [in the New Deal] that the young
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unemployed have formed a dispossessed, alienated and po-
tentially dangerous sub-stratum as a result of their marginal-
ization from mainstream social economic activities."
The view that the provision of welfare assistance decreas-
es recipients' desire or motivation to seek work or overcome
any personal difficulties that may be preventing them from
working and ultimately weakens the moral fortitude of recipi-
ents has been most notably advocated by American conserva-
tives Gilder (1981), Murray (1984) and Mead (1986, 1997). For
Murray and Mead, welfare dependency is a problem "rooted
in the values of a distinct stratum of people-the 'underclass'
-who ultimately lack a strong will to work" (Saunders &
Stone, 2000, p. 115). Further, Mead argues that the permissive
nature of the American welfare state had caused high levels of
unemployment and welfare dependency, and had left the poor
without the requisite competence and motivation to achieve
what they, and everyone else, wants (education and employ-
ment) (Mead, 1997). Gilder (1981, p. 12) too argues that "real
poverty is less a state of income than a state of mind and that
the government dole blights most of the people who come to
depend on it." Like other conservatives, Gilder asserts that the
liberal welfare state in America created a situation whereby the
poor were getting too much money for too little in return. That
is, the welfare system lacked the necessary mutual obligations.
Similarly, Murray "contends that a new anti-social, welfare-de-
pendent, dangerous class has emerged [in the U.K.] ... brought
into being by the 'incentives to failure' set by an over-gener-
ous, postwar welfare state" (MacDonald & Marsh, 2005, p. 6).
According to Murray (1984, p. 9), governments which provide
a passive entitlement-based welfare system allow individuals
to weigh up in a rational and calculating way the option of
either accepting low paid demeaning jobs or claiming welfare.
Here government is to blame for allowing the welfare system to
be misused and allowing over-reliance on the system. Murray
would thus argue, "[w]e tried to provide more for the poor
and produced more poor instead." He writes:
[t]he tangible incentives which any society can
realistically hold out to the poor youth of average
abilities and average industriousness are mostly
159
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penalties, mostly disincentives. 'Do not study and we
will throw you out; commit crimes and we will put
you in jail; do not work and we will make sure that
your existence is uncomfortable so that any job will
be preferable to it.' To promise much more is fraud.
(Murray, 1984, p. 177)
What is 'Welfare Dependency'?
It should be noted, however, that there is much debate
about whether widespread welfare dependency actually
exists. For instance, Engels (2006, p. 12) after examining the
historical use of the term welfare dependency in Australia,
remains unconvinced of its existence, writing "the Howard
Government has yet to provide any hard facts to substanti-
ate its contention that welfare dependency has or continues to
exist in Australia." Similarly, Penman concludes, based on a
review of recent literature and studies in relation to the issue of
welfare dependency, that "the concept of welfare dependency,
or income support, is generally not well defined and/or mea-
sured in loose and variable ways." Consequently, the lack of
an explicit definition and/or the means for measuring welfare
dependency makes comparison and the drawing of inferences
problematic (Penman, 2006, p. 3).
Australian academic O'Connor describes the application
of the American conservative critique of welfare dependency
in Australia as "highly suspect and disturbing" as their ar-
guments, he contends, "are, in general, empirically suspect
or at the least highly controversial, even in the U.S. context"
(O'Connor, 2001, p. 231).
Further, O'Connor questions the empirical validity and
reliability of Gilder's and Murray's work (especially claims
to have identified the behavioral characteristics of the under-
class), arguing that little detailed qualitative and quantitative
analysis around the duration of reliance on welfare, the reasons
for long-term unemployment and the employment options
available to the unemployed is offered. This lack of evidence
reveals the ideologically loaded nature of the term 'welfare de-
pendency' and as such raises serious questions about its use in
Australian welfare reform (O'Connor, 2001, p. 231).
Fraser and Gordon raise similar concerns about the use of
the term 'welfare dependency' in the U.S. context. They write:
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naming the problems of the poor, solo-mother families
as dependency tends to make them appear to be
individual problems, as much moral or psychological
as economic. The term carries strong emotive and
visual associations and a powerful pejorative charge.
In current debates, the expression welfare dependency
evokes the image of 'the welfare mother,' often figured
as a young, unmarried black woman (perhaps even a
teenager) of uncontrolled sexuality. (Fraser & Gordon,
1994, p. 311)
As O'Connor (2001, p. 231) concludes, "without detailed
evidence or ... successful and acceptable pilot schemes, welfare
reform will instead be based on gross stereotypes and social
experimentation with the lives of the unemployed and poor."
Likewise, Gentchev, referring to the adoption of what he refers
to as American "left wing welfare dependency" by the Labour
party in the U.K., warns:
Labour politicians say that 'their' welfare dependency
is about helping not attacking people on welfare. But
the experience of the last three years in the U.S. shows
the dangers of 'left wing welfare dependency.' ... the
Republicans used the anti-welfare climate created to
their own ends. They dropped the part about creating
jobs, and made the attack on AFDC [Aid to Families
with Dependent Children] a central part of their policy.
(Gentchev, 1995, sec 5, para 3)
A number of Australian critics (Harris, 2000; Henman &
Perry, 2002; Mendes, 2001; Peel, 2003; Schooneveldt, 2003)
argue that a focus on welfare dependency enabled the Howard
Government to concentrate reform efforts towards altering the
behavior and lifestyles of welfare recipients, and not on other
more fundamental issues, such as job creation and structural
inequalities. As Peel describes it, "the problem of poverty [has
been] turned into the problem of welfare dependency." He
writes:
[s]uch claims detach the problem of poverty from the
problem of inequality, portray poverty as a product
of the welfare system itself and suggest that poor
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people lack effort and initiative. In other words, we are
encouraged to focus on what is wrong with poor people,
and on their bad decisions, rather than what might be
wrong with the context in which these decisions have
to be made. (Peel, 2003, p. 23)
The notion of compelling the unemployed to engage in be-
havior and activities for "their own good" through the threat of
sanctions has its origins in Mead's New Paternalism, defined
as "social policies aimed at the poor that attempt to reduce
poverty and other social problems by directive and supervi-
sory means" (Mead, 1997, p. 2). It is "a conservative policy in
that it focuses on changing how the poor live rather than on
improving their benefits or opportunities" (Mead, 1997, p. 11).
Mead (1986) considers mandatory participation in welfare-to-
work programs to be more effective than voluntary programs,
as the latter, he contends, result in the majority of government
resources going towards assisting self-motivated job seekers,
leaving the most disadvantaged and vulnerable individuals-
"the welfare dependent" excluded. He writes:
[t]he unskilled have too many other sources of income,
including government benefits, for them to work
reliably unless programs require them to. At least
for these workers, employment must become a duty,
enforced by public authority, rather than an expression
of self-interest. (Mead, 1986, p. 13)
Here, it is assumed that individuals may not follow soci-
ety's interests and as such the new paternalist approach seeks to
prevent any divergence. The State, the wise but firm authority
figure, must be paternalistic and intervene and direct the poor
to undertake those activities that will assist them to meet their
ambitions (Mead, 1997). The prevention of "any divergence"
(such as avoidance of work) in the U.S., U.K. and Australia is
ensured through the use of sanctions which, Australian aca-
demic Anna Yeatman (2000, p. 171) argues, is defensible. She
draws on Goodin's "carefully considered defence of pater-
nalism [which provides] ... a means of securing the interest
of individuals, even if this runs counter to their freedom to
choose," to support her contention. According to Yeatman, pa-
ternalistic intervention is justified "on behalf of an individual's
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interest where their right to choose leads them to engage in
self-destructive behavior ... [or make decisions that] ... may
be seriously detrimental to their life prospects or irreversible."
Examples include, smoking, early school leaving and problem
gambling. New paternalism, she contends, can thus be justified
in instances where "authoritative others" evaluate an individ-
ual's "surface preferences" and find a mismatch between these
preferences and the individual's deeper preferences. Thus,
Yeatman sees welfare recipients in the same light as Goodin's
smokers and problem gamblers, in that:
most welfare recipients want to work, this is their deeper
preference. But their lack of positive work experience,
together with the non-work-orientated structuring of
their everyday existence, mean that they find it hard
to act on their 'deeper preference.' (Yeatman, 2000, p.
171)
The Role of Sanctions
Kalil et al. identify several possible roles for sanction
policies within the welfare system. First, the "carrot and the
stick" argument: here assistance (income support, transporta-
tion assistance and child care) acts as an incentive (the carrot)
to welfare recipients who comply with work requirements,
and for those who don't, sanctions (punishment or the stick).
Second, sanctions teach recipients "respect for the rules" by
imposing a punishment for failure to abide by those rules. A
corollary to this view is that sanctions imitate the work world
"... because employees who miss work do not get paid, clients
who do not participate should not get paid" (Kalil et al., 2002,
p. 644).
Third, sanction policies can act as a motivational tool,
where the potential threat of benefit withdrawal acts as an
incentive for recipients to comply with requirements. In line
with New Paternalist thinking, these approaches assume that
sanctions will result in behavioral change, as welfare recipients
("rational actors") will choose to comply (or not) with require-
ments, depending on their economic situations (Hasenfeld et
al., 2004; Kalil et al., 2002; Lee, Slack, & Lewis, 2004). As Kalil
et al. write:
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a client who is punished via a sanction is expected to
come back into compliance (and remain compliant)
or seek other forms of economic support, with the
end goal of avoiding further financial punishment.
Similarly, clients who are not motivated by sanctions
or who do not feel punished may have other sources
of income. In this function, sanctions may reveal those
who do not truly need cash assistance (e.g., individuals
committing welfare fraud). (Kalil et al., 2002, p. 645)
American writers Lee, Slack and Lewis are critical of the im-
plicit assumptions underpinning conservative welfare think-
ing. For instance, they reference Murray's belief that welfare
recipients are able to "accurately read the welfare context. That
is, they can know what the rules are, understand their meaning
and grasp the consequences of not following them" (2004, p.
398). Rather, they argue, many recipients lack such knowledge,
which is concerning given their finding that there is a "greater
likelihood of working and leaving welfare among those [recip-
ients] with greater understanding of current welfare policy"
(Lee et al., 2004, p. 398).
Reflecting the U.S. and U.K. experience, the use of sanc-
tions in Australia for noncompliance with activity test require-
ments is portrayed by the state as a reasonable and necessary
measure for ensuring welfare recipients' active participation.
That is, penalties for failing to meet obligations under the new
social contract are deemed just, as these obligations are owed
to the community and are thought to enhance welfare recipi-
ents' future opportunities (promote self-reliance) for economic
and social inclusion. These contentions, however, are strong-
ly contested, with critics arguing that rather than promoting
social inclusion (and self-sufficiency) these policy measures
exacerbate social exclusion (Goodin, 2002, p. 592; Savelsberg,
2009). As Kalil et al., referring to the use of sanctioning in the
U.S., note:
[tihere are questions, though, as to whether or not
sanctions change client behavior and result in so-called
rational decisions (Handler, 1995; Fein & Lee, 1999).
Clients may have undetected and serious barriers
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to compliance, such as physical and mental health
problems (Danziger et al., 2000). Clients may not be
fully aware or understand program expectations and
sanction policies. In these cases, sanctioning may result
in economic or other hardships. (Kalil et al., 2002, p.
645)
Likewise, France, referring to the U.K. experience, argues
that research (such as that undertaken by Mizen in 2004) sug-
gests that sanctioning "can cause as many problems as it aims
to solve, in that young people can 'disappear' ... and its posi-
tive impact may well be limited, in that those most likely to
suffer are vulnerable young people" (France, 2007, p. 64).
The Rise and Rise of Sanctioning
in the U.S., U.K. and Australia
A number of U.S. (Hasenfeld et al., 2004; Lindhorst &
Mancoske, 2006; Lohman et al., 2004), U.K. (MacDonald &
Marsh, 2005; Stanley, 2005) and Australian (Mullins, 2002;
Ziguras, 2001; Ziguras, Dufty, & Considine, 2003) social com-
mentators assert that sanctioning is an excessive and dis-
proportionately severe punishment for noncompliance with
welfare regulations. Further, they note that it is often the most
disadvantaged and vulnerable welfare recipients who are ad-
versely affected by sanctions.
In the U.K. during the mid 1990s, the range and duration of
sanctions available for noncompliance were expanded by the
Conservative Major Government, "including ... the possibility
that certain categories of claimants such as young single people
could have payment of benefits completely removed for up to
a period of six months" (Mizen, 2004, p. 89). Not surprisingly
the number of sanctions imposed on claimants for refusing or
failing to meet mandatory participation requirements (e.g. job
search and motivation programs) doubled from the 1993-1994
figure of 37,000 to 79,000 by 1995-1996. Mizen, citing Bivand,
refers to the conclusions of the independent Unemployment
Unit which "was forced to conclude, 'it is clear from this ...
that a positive outcome [from the active benefits regime] is a
reduction in the claimant count, rather than a positive outcome
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from the unemployed person"' (Mizen, 2004, p. 90).
There are currently no national figures on the exact number
of families affected by sanctioning in the U.S. (Wu, 2008, p. 27)
and sanctioning rates provided to the U.S. federal government
by individual states tend to vary greatly, "ranging from zero
to 29 percent of families" (Kalil et al., 2002, p. 645). It is esti-
mated, however, that "sanctions may have caused over one-
half million families to lose welfare benefits between 1997 and
1999" (Goldberg & Schott, cited in Wu, 2008, p. 27). Wu (2008,
p. 27), citing research undertaken by Pavetti, Derr and Heketh,
asserts that U.S. sanction rates are "quite high, with 45-52% of
the recipient cohort sanctioned over a 12-18 month period."
From first impressions, the proportion of welfare cases closed
as a result of sanctions in the U.S. does not seem large, with
about 6 percent of cases in the fiscal year 1998 closing due to
sanctions, compared with 22 percent that were closed due to
employment (Kalil et al., 2002, p. 645). However, this figure,
Kalil et al. argue, may represent an undercount as "more
than half (56 percent) of cases were closed for other, unspeci-
fied reasons." They write: "'[o]ther' could include procedural
reasons, such as failing to turn in certain forms or other eligi-
bility-related requirements. However, since states do not con-
sistently define the circumstances that can lead to a sanction,
'other' reasons could include noncompliance with work or
work-related rules" (Kalil et al., 2002, p. 645).
Consideration of the proportion of sanctioned families on
the TANF rolls in any given month, they further assert, "may
also underestimate the extent of sanctioning because this figure
does not include families who remain off welfare because of
sanctions imposed in earlier months" (Kalil et al., 2002, pp.
645-46). Taking into consideration these limitations, Goldberg
and Schott estimate that:
approximately 540,000 families nationwide lost
assistance between 1997 and 1999. Of those, 360,000
remained off TANF at the end of 1999, a figure that is
approximately 28 percent of the total caseload decline
during this same period. (cited in Kalil et al., 2002, p.
646)
In Australia there has been an alarming rise in the number
of people being sanctioned as a result of their failure to
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successfully maintain or complete activity test or MO require-
ments (Savelsberg, 2009). The Australian Council of Social
Services (ACOSS, 2000, 2001), for example, contends that the
total number of sanction occurrences (not the number of in-
dividuals sanctioned, which is not known) steadily increased
from 120,718 during 1997-98 to 302,494 for 1999-2000, peaking
in 2000-2001 at 386,946 sanctions before starting to decrease
over 2001-2002 and again in 2002-2003 to 269,903 in 2001-2002
and 134,239 in 2002-2003 (Eardley, Brown, Rawsthorne, Norris,
& Emrys, 2005, p. 14). According to Eardley et al., the increase
during 1995 up until mid 2001 occurred in parallel with the ex-
pansion of obligations and requirements placed on workforce-
aged recipients and the introduction of the Job Network in 1998.
The steep rise in sanctions in 2000-2001, they argue, can be at-
tributed to several possible factors, including the Australian
Council of Social Services' (ACOSS) assertion that this reflects
a time where Centrelink officers were taking a tougher stand
on sanctioning practice. Another reason, however, could be
that the number of activity test requirements to be completed
increase each year, thus increasing the likelihood that recipi-
ents will struggle or fail to meet them (Eardley et al., 2005).
In regards to the distribution of sanctions amongst income
support recipients, a number of American (Hasenfeld et al.,
2004; Kalil et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2004; Lohman et al., 2004),
British (France, 2007; MacDonald & Marsh, 2005; Mizen, 2004)
and Australian studies (ACOSS, 2000, 2001; Lackner, 2001;
Moses & Sharples, 2000; Sanders, 1999) have identified sanc-
tioned claimants as more disadvantaged economically and
socially than non-sanctioned recipients. Specifically, these
studies show that sanctioned welfare recipients are on average
less educated, younger, likely to be living in dysfunctional or
abusive family circumstances, be experiencing utility hard-
ships (reduced or complete inability to pay for gas, electricity,
water and rent) and accommodation instability, and suffering
mental and/or physical ill health.
American new paternalist and sanction advocate Lawrence
Mead is, however, dismissive of higher-than-expected sanc-
tion rates in the U.S. Commenting on the high sanction rates
recorded for a number of U.S. workfare programs, he argues
that "demanding programs," such as workfare, can result in
higher-than-average sanction rates:
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particularly when demands on recipients are first
raised, and these sanctions generate part of the welfare
savings recorded ... once expectations are made clear,
sanctions decrease ... most people leave welfare of
their own accord and not because they are forced, or
'thrown,' off. (Mead, 1997, p. 60)
Mead is also dismissive of concerns about those who are
"de facto sanctioned"-those discouraged from claiming
welfare as a result of tough work policies. He writes "good evi-
dence about the diverted is lacking. All one can say is that to
date throwing people off welfare has little to do with the suc-
cesses of work enforcement" (1997, p. 60). This, however, was
not found to be the case for many Australian income support
recipients. For example, the Australian Independent Review of
Breaches and Penalties in the Social Security System concluded
that:
while the system often functions in an appropriate
manner, there are many occasions on which its
operation in relation to particular jobseekers can be
reasonably described as arbitrary, unfair or excessively
harsh ... [Further] ... it diminishes people's capacity
and opportunity to continue seeking work and become
less dependent on social security. (Pearce, Disney, &
Ridout, 2002, pp. 12-13)
Despite Mead's assurances to the contrary, it is clear from
this thematic analysis of U.S., U.K. and Australian research
that for many, if not most, welfare recipients sanctioning exac-
erbates rather than ameliorates social disadvantage.
A New Social Contract or the 'Politics of Enforcement'
Bill Jordan (1996) invokes the phrase 'politics of enforce-
ment' to understand the contemporary social, economic
and political dynamics underpinning welfare and policy
reforms. Here an attempt is undertaken to capture the inter-
secting dynamics of neo-liberalism and market globalization
and to analyze the effects on social conditions for individu-
als, families and communities. Jordan argues that the state,
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in response to the imperative of globalization, moves from
Keynesian-inspired policies to Schumpeterian ones. In the
Schumpeterian Workfare State "governments design social
policies to enhance labor market flexibility rather than follow-
ing the social democratic aim of extending citizenship" (John,
1998, p. 102).
The corollary is not only more precarious economic cir-
cumstances, but also that increasingly the basis of communi-
ty is altered. As Jordan (1996, p. 34) notes, the move is away
from facilitating a community promoting a "virtuous circle of
civic trust, economic cooperation and social harmony leading
to democratic prosperity ... [to] a vicious circle of suspicion,
isolation, exploitation and authoritarian backwardness." Thus
Jordan argues that:
the perception of a deviant and dependent 'underclass,'
living on crime and practicing various kinds of social
deviancy, and claiming from the labor and prosperity
of the rest of the community, has generated a 'politics
of enforcement.' (Jordan 1996, p. 35)
Further, as Ingram, Schneider and Deleon (2007, p. 103)
contend, the "politics of punishment" has dominated much
of the public policy aimed at "deviants," with policymakers
gaining "considerable political capital from punishing those
who do not have the power, resources or wherewithal to fight
back and whom the broader public believes are undeserving
of anything better." Here, as Goodin demonstrates, the fair
sounding principles of mutual obligation find punitive policy
expression-"merely ... humiliating and harassing the sub-
ordinate classes until they finally accept their inferior social
status and drop (or are dropped off) the welfare rolls" (Goodin,
2002, p. 592).
The most visible manifestation of the politics of enforce-
ment in Australia, the U.S. and U.K. has been sanctioning. For
many welfare recipients, the move towards greater activity
test requirements, means testing, compulsion and increased
sanctioning provisions has been devastating. These mea-
sures in large part have contributed to the removal of sub-
stantial numbers of people from social assistance-the cost of
which has been transferred to families, the community and
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individuals. Importantly, these punitive policies appear to
alienate and debilitate those sanctioned, rather than activate
and engage them on positive and inclusionary pathways.
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